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Abstract  
 
Recent European studies present persistently critical views of the under performance 
of government backed venture capital (GVC) schemes when compared to their 
private sector counterparts. However, they assess the performance of outmoded 
funding models and fail to contextualise the economic development role of these 
schemes.  
 
This paper provides a contemporary assessment of the business impacts of the UK 
government’s flagship Enterprise Capital Funds (ECFs) VC scheme in addressing 
the sub-£2m equity finance gap facing young potential high growth businesses 
requiring investments. Supply and demand-side evidence is presented from 
interviews with ECF fund managers, alternative private VCs, industry experts and 
surveys of successful and unsuccessful scheme applicants.  
 
We find that, despite the limitations of mid-scheme evaluation, ECFs are addressing 
the UK equity gap and delivering business employment, revenue and innovation 
impacts. However, further progress is required in order to achieve optimal business 
exits and sustainable early stage private VC system impacts.     
 
Introduction  
 
It is notable that many of the most flourishing venture capital (VC) markets globally 
are catalysed by government support (Lerner, 2009, 2010 and 2011). Since the 
global financial crisis (GFC) intensification in government VC (GVC) scheme 
investment has occurred, driven by governments’ desire to support innovation and 
business growth (Mazzucato and Penna, 2014; Lerner 2010), to plug seed and early 
stage investment gaps created by retrenchment to later stage funding by bank debt 
and private VC finance (Wilson and Silva, 2013; North et al., 2013; Cowling et al., 
2012) and attempts to attract private investment, enhanced by increasing ability to 
attract foreign inward investment in the information age (Lerner et al., 2005, Lerner 
2010; Hopp, 2010).  
 
In Europe public investment in VC doubled to 1.6bnE between 2007 and 2011, 
increasing its share from 9.9% to 39.1% (EVCA, 2013). In the UK, Murray (2007) has 
suggested that since the Dotcom crisis, the proportion of government funding in seed 
and early stage VC increased, whilst Mason and Pierrakis (2013) indicated a rise 
from 20% to 68% between 2000 and 2008. This trend has most likely continued post 
GFC, given that British Venture Capital Association (BVCA, 2013) member seed and 
early stage VC investments in 2011 and 2012 were just £350m, similar to 1999 prior 
to the Dotcom bubble. This phenomenon alongside recent large scale data which 
cast questions over the value of GVC schemes (Munari and Toschi, 2015; Grilli and 
Murtinu, 2014), make it apposite to take a closer look at a major European GVC 
scheme.   
   
This paper assesses the business impacts of the UK government’s Enterprise Capital 
Funds (ECFs), the UK’s foremost GVC scheme addressing the equity finance gap 
facing young potential high growth small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) 
requiring investments up to £2m. Established in 2006, ECFs have received £840m 
UK government investment, including a £400m three year extension tranche 
announced in Autumn 20141, thus far creating 18 rolling 10 year limited life funds. As 
Lerner (2002) and Tokila and Haapanen (2009) suggest, scheme assessment should 
consider its aims and objectives, whilst Greene (2009) highlights the need for 
thorough mixed methods approaches to more fully understand impacts. The ECF has 
a dual rationale to plug the early stage finance gap and develop potential high growth 
SMEs, and to stimulate the creation of new early stage VC funds, providing 
demonstration effects that encourage other private VCs into early stage investment, 
developing a sustainable VC ecosystem in the UK. Whilst the second aim meets 
Lerner’s (2010) requirement for GVCs to catalyse private sector VC ecosystems and 
withdraw, this paper focuses on how the ECF model impacts on businesses, 
addressing Cumming et al. (2014) in examining how effective the design of 
contemporary GVC funds are.  
 
The paper draws on empirical interim ECF evaluation demand and policy supply-side 
evidence in early 2014, including ECF fund managers, other contemporary UK seed 
and early stage risk equity financiers and views from the wider business support 
services ecosystem. The focus is on a survey of 75 SMEs assisted by ECFs, since 
their inception in 2006, examining the evolving design and approach of the ECFs and 
their impacts on business development. This spans a period immediately prior to the 
GFC during which the first ‘pathfinder’ group of eight ECFs were established, 
                                                          
1
 UK Chancellor of the Exchequer’s Autumn Statement,  03/12/2014   
between 2006-08, and post the onset of the GFC when the newer group of six ECFs 
included in the study were established between 2010 and 2013.  
 
The paper initially summarises the theoretical context relating to GVC policy 
intervention, scheme design and the evolution of the ECFs, before presenting the 
methodology and key ECF business impact findings. It concludes by discussing the 
findings and considering how ECFs might achieve their longer term aim of 
establishing a sustainable seed and early stage UK private sector-led VC market. 
 
Theoretical Context  
 
GVC theories can be defined as predominantly supply-side relating to the rationale 
for government intervention, addressing an equity gap and developing a VC 
ecosystem (Lerner’s, 2010 vision of developing professional VC support services), 
and the related design and implementation of schemes, addressing the fit for 
purpose question. Demand side theories relate to the entrepreneurial ecosystem and 
whether there is an adequate supply of suitable young investible potential high 
growth businesses (Mason and Brown’s enterprise pipeline, 2013).  
 
Supply side rationale     
 
The rationale for government support to young potential high growth businesses is 
predicated on the certification hypothesis, suggesting that policies can pick winners, 
or in the case of co-funded public-private investment schemes, can pick winning 
partners (Baldock and Mason, 2014) who can affectively select businesses and 
assist growth that would otherwise not take place. Colombo et al. (2014) also find 
that government funding may signal quality to other private investors, generating a 
crowding-in effect. Since potential high growth firms are associated with innovation, 
revenue and job generation (OECD, 2002; Audretsch et al. 2002; Nesta, 2009; ERC, 
20142), economic growth and economic rebalancing through development of high 
value export products and services (HM Treasury and BIS, 2011), GVC schemes 
have come to the fore in the post GFC period (Wilson and Silva, 2013), particularly 
focusing on seed and early stage development where external financing for these 
businesses appears most problematic.  
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 ERC (2014) developing on Nesta (2009) suggested that whilst a vital 6% of firms generated over 50% of new 
jobs, between 2008-2013 38% of new UK jobs were generated by 1% of businesses.   
 Since Macmillan (1931) first estimated a finance gap at below £200,000, equating to 
below £5m today, the evidence is that the gap relating to entrepreneurial risk finance 
varies in intensity and scale over time, as demand and supply alter, with supply-side 
intervention policies able to narrow the gap (Murray, 2007; Lerner, 2005, 2010). 
Deakins and Freel (2012) define the equity gap as between the upper limits of 
business angel finance and the minimum capital requirement for the public equity 
market, considered to range from £250,000 to £2m in the UK in the mid 2000s when 
the ECFs were established (Murray, 2007). By the late 2000s, evidence of the trend 
for private VCs to retreat to later stage investments suggested that the gap had 
extended beyond £2m to over £10m (Rowlands, 2009; SQW, 2009), whilst as the 
recession took hold in 2009-10 blockages in the supply of business angel finance 
suggested that the gap was also encroaching into the seed and start-up finance 
stage at below £250,000 (Johnson, 2009; Mason et al. 2010).   
 
The finance gap is caused by market imperfections (Modigliani and Miller, 1958) with 
information asymmetries considered a major cause (Akerlof, 1970; Myers and Majluf, 
1984) due to the unequal knowledge exchange between financiers and businesses. 
This is particularly problematic for young high growth potential businesses without 
track records to demonstrate their market traction and value, and often lacking 
sufficient collateral with their true value being associated with intangible intellectual 
property (IP) (Hsu, 2004). These businesses require risk equity finance, but face 
problems of adverse selection and moral hazard (Carpenter and Peterson, 2002) 
resulting from the prohibitively high cost of due diligence for relatively small–scale 
seed and early stage investments and reflected in the resultant poor performance of 
these equity markets in recent years (Mason et al., 2010; BVCA, 2013).  
 The temporal changes in the supply of finance are captured in the finance escalator 
model (Nesta, 2009a), which incorporates Berger and Udell’s (1998) concept of 
declining information opacity of young firms as they progress through the business 
development cycle. This suggests that as businesses develop and gain market 
traction a different and wider range of finance (debt and equity) become available. 
The escalator model can be used to demonstrate finance gaps and pinpoint where 
GVCs can make most impact (Baldock and Mason, 2015; Harrison, 2014; North et 
al., 2013; Gill, 2010).  
 
Colombo et al. (2014) raise one further important market failure hypothesis that 
GVCs can address social pay-offs and externalities that private transactions take no 
account of. They view this as contentious, requiring careful attention to scheme 
design and context, since it may typically take place in peripheral, less favoured thin 
markets and can lead to underperforming investments and crowding out of private 
investors (Armour and Cumming, 2006).    
 
Ecosystem and demand side theories 
 
The development of a more efficient seed and early stage financing escalator, is 
pyramidal, based on a sufficient pipeline supply of young investible businesses 
(Mason and Pierrakis, 2013; Mason and Brown, 2013). This requires a carefully 
integrated policy to develop the VC and equity finance and entrepreneurial 
ecosystems (Hwang and Horowitt, 2012; Hughes, 2009), taking into account both the 
supply-side mechanism and also the potential demand-side failures in relation to 
investment readiness (Mason and Kwok, 2010).  
 From a supply-side perspective, Hall and Lerner (2010) find that private VCs can 
address funding gaps, overcoming information asymmetries, adverse selection and 
moral hazard through their screening, monitoring and management support 
processes. However, in an under developed market where there are gaps in VC 
investment, Colombo et al. (2014) suggest that GVC can attract, train, nurture and 
raise the quality and volume of private VC. Lerner (2010) finds it essential for GVC 
schemes to attract skilled private investors and embed an early stage VC investment 
culture and support service network (e.g. specialist accountants, lawyers, advisors).  
 
From the demand-side, developing the resource based knowledge of small firm 
management is essential (Baldock et al., 2015; Mac an Bhaird, 2010; North et al., 
2013), alongside broadening the pecking order financial preferences of 
entrepreneurs (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Norton, 1991) and tackling signalling issues 
which may particularly affect the ability of entrepreneurs in more peripheral areas to 
find and obtain equity funding (Mueller et al. 2014; Amini et al. 2012). Whilst this 
paper focuses on the supply-side, the extent of intermediary knowledge and visibility 
of ECFs to entrepreneurs is discussed.            
 
Design theories 
 
There would appear to be a strong justification for public policy intervention in order 
to address market failure, but policy interventions require careful consideration of 
potential pitfalls (Brander et al., 2008; Murray and Lingelbach, 2009; Lerner, 2010; 
Cumming et al. 2013) which may result from agency failures (Akerlof, 1976) from 
poor management and policy making. In recent times there has been a proliferation 
of GVC design theories, drawing on global experiences in searching for the holy grail 
of an established private sector-led early stage finance market which addresses the 
equity gap (e.g. Murray 2007; NAO, 2009; Lerner 2002, 2009, 2010, 2011; Lerner et 
al., 2005; Pierrakis, 2010; Technopolis, 2011; Mulcahy, 2013; Cumming, 2011 and 
2014).  Whilst it is important to take into account different institutional environments 
(Florida and Kenney, 1988), very few GVC schemes have been deemed successful 
(Brander et al. 2008; Lerner, 2009; Colombo et al. 2014). The most successful in 
terms of developing early stage private VC investment and generating successful 
exits have been the US Small Business Investment Company (SBIC, 1958), Israeli 
Yozma funds (1993) and Australian Innovation Investment Fund (IIF, 1997). Many 
more recently established funds have not had sufficient time for proper assessment.  
 
An extensive review of GVC studies suggests that the more successful schemes are; 
private VC led, attract co-investment, inward investment and experienced VCs who 
up-skill local VCs over time, are time limited but extendable to facilitate optimal exit 
timing, monitor and adjust to changing market requirements, have sufficient scale of 
funding and target market, remain focused and avoid mission creep, and operate 
within a wider supportive entrepreneurial and financing ecosystem which takes into 
account exit market opportunities. These points are developed below.       
 
First, Murray (2007) recognised GVC schemes’ shift towards private sector-led 
‘hybrid’ co-funding arrangements, which Colombo et al. (2014) characterise as a shift 
from direct funding which might require private match funding (e.g. Finnish Industry 
Investment’s direct funding to businesses) to private VC-led  co-funding (e.g. the UK 
ECFs) or fund of fund structures (e.g. UK Innovation Investment Fund). Lerner (2002) 
questioned the legitimacy of government officials running funding schemes, noting 
the potential for political distortion and propping up favoured businesses. By the end 
of the decade Lerner (2010) strongly advocated a private sector-led approach 
investing in viable businesses. He highlights the Israeli Yozma funds3 and their ability 
to attract foreign investment and skilled fund managers to provide a demonstrator 
effect for other private fund managers to follow. A key part of the private sector-led 
approach is the ability to leverage co-investment funding from the private sector, 
increasing fund size and engendering a private sector investment dynamic. Recent 
large data European (Grilli and Murtinu, 2014) and UK (Munari and Toschi, 2015) 
studies point to the importance of experienced hands-on private sector fund 
managers and support the view that successful VCs have niche “hard to imitate” 
knowledge of sectors and stages (BIS, 2011) and are persistent performers who 
build on their experience over time (Gompers et al. 2010; Zarutskie, 2010).  
  
Second, that government intervention should add value to the market (Wallsten, 
2000) and withdraw when its job is complete in order to avoid private sector reliance 
and crowding out (Lerner, 2010). In this respect, Lerner strongly advocates time 
limited schemes (e.g. the 10 year Limited Partnership (LP) model) driven by private 
sector performance dynamics which avoid evergreen fund pitfalls of persistently 
funding poor performing portfolio businesses, as exhibited in Murray et al.’s (2009) 
GVC review of Finland. Lerner et al. (2005) acknowledge that achieving this 
performance balance requires regular monitoring to avoid counter arguments that 
private sector-led GVC potentially cherry pick the best company investments, crowd 
out the private sector, distort and inflate market valuations, and fail to address wider 
economic development objectives, such as regional development (Oakey, 2003; 
Leleux and Surlemont, 2003; Da Rin et al., 2006; Brander et al. 2008).     
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 Third, the required size and scale of GVC activity is widely debated. UK and 
European VC funds have been dwarfed by their US counterparts; US funds distribute 
over five times the value from less than four times the number of funds (Ernst & 
Young, 2010). The implication is that UK GVC funds have insufficient scale to 
achieve Markowitz’s (1952) portfolio size optimization. Technopolis (2011) European 
VC report recommended that funds require sufficient size to follow-on invest in their 
best portfolio companies and avoid forced early exits at sub-optimal value, 
suggesting a minimum fund size of £40m for a seed or early stage VC. In this 
respect, the ability of GVCs to achieve timely fund cycle development, raising 
investment for second funds (Gompers and Lerner, 2001) is crucial and appears to 
have been badly hampered across Europe by declining early stage investment post 
GFC (Dittmer et al., 2014). Dittmer et al. (2014) also suggest that a possible solution 
to European GVC scale is to operate across borders on a pan-European scale, as 
evidenced by the UK Innovation Investment Fund (BIS, 2012).    
 
Fourth, GVC funds require a wide enough focus to meet a sufficiently good pipeline 
of investible businesses. Reports on the failings of UK (NAO, 2009) and Finnish 
(Murray et al., 2009) regional GVC funds highlight their being too small in scale and 
narrowly focused into regions to generate sufficient critical mass of investment and 
returns. This suggests that funds which are sector or stage specific are likely to 
locate in high density clusters, such as London’s Tech City seed VCs, or to syndicate 
and work with other VCs and investors such as the recently emerging angel capital 
groups (Baldock and Mason, 2015) in order to facilitate inter-regional and 
international investments (Hopp, 2010; Hopp and Rieder, 2011). 
 
Fifth, GVC schemes require a long term minimum 10 year view (Lerner, 2010) with 
flexibility to extend further. Whilst Lerner advocates regular monitoring to ensure that 
funds are performing their intended roles and to avoid mission creep to safer later 
stage investments (Murray et al., 2009; Gill, 2015), it is equally important that 
government avoids micro managing and allows GVC funds to develop over sufficient 
time. The trend towards a doubling in early stage VC portfolio exit timetables, from 
around four years in the early 2000s to around eight years post GFC (Mason and 
Harrison, 2015; Baldock and North, 2015; CfEL, 2013; Axelson and Martinovic, 2012; 
Pierrakis, 2010) has rekindled debates as to whether 10 year LP GVCs will be able to 
allow their portfolio firms to fully mature and avoid early sales and potential share 
value dilution. Mason and Brown (2013) point to the importance of an exit market, for 
trade sales and initial public offerings (IPOs)(Baldock, 2015) in delivering blockbuster 
VC exits which will lead to recycled funds and new private VC entry.   
 
Finally, GVC operates within a holistic entrepreneurial financing ecosystem which 
supports enterprise development and appropriate funding supply (Hughes, 2009). 
From the VC scheme design perspective Lerner (2010) stresses the importance of 
developing support and promotional networks, making them visible and accessible, 
linking different types of finance and financial intermediaries and avoiding duplication. 
This emphasises the umbrella role of state investment banks such as the German 
KfW4 in operating technology funds (Grunderfonds) and managing the evolving 
finance escalator, highlighting the role that the new British Business Bank can play in 
achieving this in the UK (Breedon, 2011; Cumming, 2011; Gill, 2015; Mazzucato and 
Penna, 2014; Van der Schans, 2015). 
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The Role of ECFs  
 
The Enterprise Capital Funds (ECFs), introduced in 2006, mark an important 
advance in UK GVC schemes, notably the previous small-scale public-led Regional 
Venture Capital Funds (Colombo et al. 2014). They represent a significant increase 
in the size and scale of funding and a concerted effort to deliver private VC-led co-
investment funds.    
 
Between 2000-2012 the UK Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) 
placed £600m in 34 VC funds, financing over 1,000 businesses (CfEL, 2013), with 
private funding leverage of 0.5x which was set to rise to almost 1x during the lifetime 
of the current schemes. Increased private funding leverage results from the increase 
in co-funding schemes (Murray, 2007), mainly relating to the ECFs, UK Innovation 
Investment Fund (UKIIF)5 and Angel Co-investment Fund (ACF), all designed to 
stimulate private sector investment to increase fund size and generate a private 
sector-led fund performance dynamic (Lerner, 2010).  
 
From establishment the ECFs have had two main objectives6: first, to provide gap 
funding for potential high growth SMEs, mainly in seed and early stage development 
requiring £250,000 to £2m; second, to provide a demonstration model for early stage 
institutional VCs, by establishing a UK early stage VC ecosystem and encouraging 
new private fund managers into the market, effectively addressing recommendations 
for private sector-led public funds (Lerner et al. 2005). These key objectives have not 
                                                          
5
 UKIIF operates with £150m of UK government funding matched by a further £180m of public and private 
funding from two ‘fund of funds’ managed by the Hermes Environmental Innovation Fund and the European 
Investment Fund’s UK Technologies Fund (Baldock and North, 2015)  
6
 Excluded sectors: motor vehicles, shipbuilding, coal, steel, transport and agriculture and fisheries 
changed over time, although the individual funding models have evolved with greater 
focus from 2010 on seed and earlier stage VC. 
 
The funds require a minimum of one third private investment, restricting private 
individual investment to 50% of the private funding contribution to broaden the private 
investment base. They are not pari passu (as favoured by EU schemes), offering an 
up-side priority private investor return7 to encourage improved fund management 
performance, as favoured by Lerner et al. (2005) and Jaaskelainen et al. (2007) to  
encourage competent early stage private investors. The funds are formed under 10 
year Limited Partnership (LP) status, with options to extend up to 12 years, a feature 
which complies with Lerner’s (2010) requirements for GVCs to have flexibility to 
enable maximisation of their portfolio exits.   
 
The UK government provided £240m in 2006 for the initial eight pathfinder ECFs, 
£200m in 2010 for eight further funds, and £400m for Autumn 2014-2017. The recent 
rise in the scale of ECF funding continues the trend in increasing UK GVC scheme 
funding since 2000. It demonstrated the UK government’s commitment to developing 
the seed and early stage VC market and followed negotiations leading to the EU’s 
January 2014 increase in the state aid limit (EC, 2014a) from £2m to £5m on initial 
investments into portfolio companies, alongside increasing follow-on funding to 15mE 
capped at 15% of fund value (rising from 10%) and with the public funding limit 
doubling to £50m for individual funds. This scaling up meets the recommendations 
for larger scale European funds to adequately facilitate follow-on funding and 
optimise business growth and exit values achieved (Technopolis, 2011; Rigos, 2011).      
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(insert T1)  
 
ECF funds have increased in scale over time (Table 1), rising from an average 
£26.875m for the eight pathfinder funds to £41.075m for the eight second tranche 
funds, reaching the scale recommended by Technopolis (2011) for a sustainable 
GVC funding cycle. The funds are individual, mainly serving the seed and early stage 
UK VC markets, and include generalist sector agnostic and specialist sector funds, 
notably in technology and IT. A feature is the concentration of 16 out of 18 funds with 
headquarters within the London-Oxbridge triangle, being drawn to the traditional 
bedrock of UK new technology companies, with only three funds having offices in 
other regions covering the East Midlands and Scotland. To some extent this is off-set 
by the presence of European Regional Development Fund regional VC funds, with a 
particularly strong presence in the North East (£125m), Yorkshire and the Humber 
(£100m) and North West (£190m) regions and Wales (£150m)8. The ECFs, with the 
exception of the more recent Notion fund, which has additional European Investment 
Fund (EIF) investment, operate under the former EU state aid limit of £2m maximum 
initial investment into individual portfolio companies, with an overall limit on follow-on 
funding of 10% of fund value in any one portfolio company. This level of funding 
appears more suited to shorter horizon digitech investment (Baldock et al., 2015; 
North et al., 2013) and is likely to be insufficient for long horizon capital intensive 
R&D investment sectors such as life science (Rowlands, 2009; SQW, 2009) and 
underpins the 2014 increase in EU state aid limits on follow-on funding.          
 
There is further evidence of scheme evolution to adjust to changing post GFC market 
requirements. The second tranche of ECFs, since 2010, contain innovative features 
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designed to enhance their impacts. These include the Notion fund being able to 
invest beyond the £2m state aid limit in European companies, with a minimum 
investment requirement into UK based companies aligned to the UK government’s 
investment, which is similar to the operation of the pan national UKIIF, supporting 
Lerner’s (2010) globalisation of VC thesis and that specialist sector-based funds can 
operate on a more effective scale if they are international (Dittmer et al., 2014). There 
is also avoidance of the RVCFs’ regional market limitations in the 2000s (NAO, 
2009). The Foresight ECF focuses on Nottinghamshire businesses, receiving a 
bonus for local investments, but is also able to invest in other parts of the UK in order 
to ensure a suitably sized and balanced portfolio. Greater focus is given to seed and 
early stage investment in the second tranche ECFs, following Lerner et al.’s (2005) 
recommendations that schemes have to be flexible to adapt to the market’s 
requirements, which in the UK post GFC saw a sharp decline in seed and early stage 
investing (BVCA, 2013). The London based Passion seed fund operates as an 
accelerator in order to maximise portfolio funding opportunities and minimise due 
diligence costs. This pure seed fund operates at well below the typical £250,000 
lower investment of most ECFs, focusing on seed and earlier stage syndication 
investments to spread risk and make investments more attractive to later stage VCs 
(Hopp, 2010). It has provided a seed funding model in London that other private VCs 
and angel capital groups are following (e.g. EC1, Connect Ventures, Playfair Capital).  
 
A feature of the ECFs is their stretch-funding provision to new fund managers, 
attracting highly skilled European and US investors, capacity building the sector and 
potentially providing sufficient fund scale to create a lasting legacy, following Lerner 
et al.’s (2005) inward investment investor skills recommendation. An important 
element of this VC development cycle is generation of second funds (Gompers and 
Lerner, 2001) that can build on the initial ECFs, providing further scale-up and ability 
for substantial follow-on funding to the best performing portfolio companies. Notably, 
thus far, the scheme has seen just four second funds created (Table 1) and these 
have taken six to eight years to appear after the first funds, which may have resulted 
in some portfolio company funding shortfalls (examined later).  
 
Over time the ECF scheme aims to establish a sustainable private seed and early 
stage VC market in the UK and then withdraw (as advocated by Lerner, 2010). 
However, the absence of blockbuster exits, due to the poor exit markets in the post 
GFC period, has prevented recycling of investment funds and signalling of 
widespread encouragement of private VCs into these markets (Mason and Brown, 
2013). As such there is no evidence of the scheme withdrawing and it is likely to 
have an increasing presence in follow-on investments upstream into the ‘series A-B’ 
later phases in order to generate optimal exits (as predicted by Cumming, 2011).         
Approach and methodology  
 
This paper uses a pragmatic mixed methods approach (Patton, 1990). Whilst 
predominately based on a demand-side quantitative cross-sectional survey of 75 
ECF assisted businesses, it also incorporates elements of longitudinal demand-side 
survey and qualitative case studies, qualitative supply-side perspectives from VC 
fund managers and industry stakeholders and secondary scheme and industry data 
(outlined in Table 2). The aim is to provide a rounded and triangulated analysis which 
provides insightful findings (Creswell, 2003).   
 
(insert T2) 
 
Secondary data review included ECF scheme data (2006-2013) provided by the 
British Business Bank and contextual parallel timescale VC industry data from the UK 
and Europe, drawn from the British Venture Capital Association (BVCA) and Preqin’s 
private European VC data set. The ECF desk study relates to 166 businesses funded 
through the first 12 funds operational by the end of 2013. Additionally, surveys were 
undertaken in February 2014 with assisted and unassisted applicant businesses, 
ECF fund managers, other UK seed and early stage investors, and industry 
stakeholders to provide triangulation of robust supply-side and demand-side data 
(Brewer and Hunter, 1989). A caveat is the interim, largely cross-sectional, nature of 
the research, at a stage when even the older funds operating for up to eight years 
have yet to experience their plum stellar exits, which typically take place later 
(Wiltbank, 2005). However, it has been possible to obtain a highly representative 
sample of both demand and supply-side data and cross-section of stakeholder 
viewpoints.  
 A survey of 75 ECF recipient businesses, covering 12 active funds representing 45% 
of the scheme’s portfolio businesses, was undertaken using CATI recorded 
telephone interviews9 with senior managers. Surveyed businesses were randomly 
selected being restricted only by survey time frame constraints and requests from 
fund managers that portfolio businesses that had exited, closed or were undergoing 
exits should be excluded (representing 30 recipients). There were also 23 refusals, 
with the owner-managers of the remaining 38 businesses being unobtainable for 
interview within the survey time period of 4 weeks in February 2014. 
Representativeness tests (Mann-Whitney two-tailed tests reveal no significant 
differences by sector, stage and region between the overall and surveyed samples, 
noted in Table 2). Stage analysis adopted in the study complies with the standard 
BVCA definitions (Appendix 1), adopted by the British Business Bank. Survey piloting 
on five businesses ensured effective questioning and routing (Patton, 1990). 
Interviews took 30 minutes on average, covering a series of mainly closed pre-coded 
questions, supplemented by strategic open questions to explore explanations and 
processes. Questions addressed: business profile (e.g. employment size, sector; 
stage, location); external financing history and requirements; reasons for seeking 
ECF; ECF leverage, additionality, displacement and attribution to post funding 
business performance (HM Treasury, 201310); exit timetables and strategies. 
Additionally five case studies were undertaken with failed ECF business write-downs 
and supplementary counterfactual data is drawn from short telephone interviews with 
five ‘dead deals’ where applicants did not receive ECF finance.  
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 The research was compliant to HM Treasury Greenbook (2013) UK government additionality and 
displacement measures.  
Longitudinal telephone survey work was undertaken with 8 surviving ECF recipient 
businesses between 2010 and 2013 (representing one fifth of the ECF business 
portfolio in 2010) and benchmarking reference is made to the BIS (2010) early 
assessment survey of 12 ECF recipient businesses (Marshall and Rossman, 1999).   
 
In parallel, in early 2014, supply-side interviews were undertaken face-to-face or by 
telephone with fund managers at all 14 current ECFs11 (including two new funds yet 
to invest), using a semi-structured interview approach. These were supplemented by 
13 interviews with other private VC, Venture Capital Trust (VCT) and angel capital 
group fund managers operating in the UK seed and early stage equity markets along 
with six interviews with industry stakeholder experts including the BVCA, UK 
Business Angel Association (UKBAA), European Investment Fund (EIF) and St 
John’s Innovation Centre, Cambridge. These interviews focused on the role and 
effectiveness of delivery of the ECFs and were recorded, transcribed and checked by 
respondents to correct errors (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Collectively, they 
provided an extensive contemporary assessment of the UK’s seed and early stage 
equity market and ECFs’ current and likely future impacts.  
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 Amadeus IV, second ECF introduced early 2014, was also discussed at interview 
ECFs’ impacts on assisted businesses  
 
Drawing mainly on empirical survey evidence collected in February 2014, the paper 
now examines the ECFs’ impacts on assisted businesses, alongside some 
counterfactual evidence drawn from unsuccessful ‘dead deals’.  
 
Meeting financing requirements 
 
ECFs have addressed the equity financing needs of predominantly young, seed and 
early stage businesses (Table 3). Comparing first the overall scheme data (n=166) 
with BVCA member VC investment data (averaged over three years 2010-12 to avoid 
annual skew), it is clear that ECFs are considerably more focused on seed and early 
stage VC investment (65% compared to 38%) in meeting the private sector VC gap 
in the UK market. ECF’s are also contributing to rebalancing the UK economy with 
35% of investments in industrial sectors (e.g. advanced manufacturing, electrical 
engineering), but are comparatively underrepresented in the health sector. ECFs 
relatively high proportion of investments in digitech sectors (e.g. mobile applications 
and Internet based activities), suggest a preference for shorter horizon investing 
(almost half of ECF investments relate to technology/telecommunications and 
consumer services, above the BVCA investors’ 41%). ECF investments are also 
even more concentrated into the London-Oxbridge triangle (London, South East and 
East of England regions) than the BVCA investors (68% compared to 61%). This 
reflects the UK’s concentrations of high tech innovative businesses and VC financing 
(Mason and Pierrakis, 2013), but also the operation of regional GVCFs in Scotland, 
Wales and North of England (Baldock and Mason, 2015).  
 
(Insert T3) 
 
At the time of initial funding the 75 surveyed recipient businesses were typically small 
(median 15 employees) and pre or early trading. Funding was mainly sought for 
R&D, early commercialisation, key staff recruitment (mainly R&D technicians and 
sales staff), and working capital to fund growth (Table 4). One quarter referred to 
start-up capital requirements and, overall, the reasons for seeking ECF finance were 
heavily influenced by the earlier stage requirements of the assisted businesses, with 
only one in twelve surveyed businesses seeking funding for later stage acquisitions 
and management buy-outs/ins – these mainly coming from the earlier pathfinder 
funds with later stage focus. The businesses typically described themselves as 
classical ‘gap funding’ candidates: “Too early stage for institutional and corporate VC 
funding and requiring too much funding for individual angels or angel networks to 
fund.” 
 
 (insert T4) 
 
ECF investments cover seed and more substantive early stage ‘series A’ and ‘B’ 
rounds, ranging from £20,000 seed investment to a share of a £9m ‘series B’ early 
commercialisation round, with a mean of £964,000, and supplying 90% of the amount 
applied for. Average ECF shareholdings were 19%, ranging from 4% to 60%, 
reflecting the high proportion of early stage investments where business valuations 
were relatively low. The shift towards seed and earlier stage investment by post 2010 
ECFs has resulted in average recipient business funding falling from £1.14m pre-
2010 to £547,000 post-2010.  
 
Half the surveyed recipients applied for alternative funding immediately prior to their 
ECF application. This was proportionally lower amongst post GFC recipients (42% 
compared to 59% pre GFC), suggesting increasing scarcity of suitable alternative 
financing. They mainly approached equity sources, with half accepting offers. A 
further one in ten (7 cases) rejected offers, preferring the fund managers and growth 
opportunities ECF offered. Some managers suggested “alternative early stage 
corporate VC would be restrictive in terms of product and market development” 
stressing the “meeting of minds” required for equity investment (Baldock et al., 2015). 
Only 7% applied for bank finance, none since 2010. It was mainly “out of the 
question”, as the businesses were too risky, being early stage without a trading track 
record of at least two years.  
 
Although ECFs are not required to lever additional private funding, their initial 
investments typically represented half of the overall funding round. Just 2% was 
duplicative, where managers considered additional funds were raised “instead of 
ECF”, and they attributed almost half (46%; 1:0.46 ratio) as levered in by ECF. Post 
2010 this ratio rose to parity, mainly through angel and VCs syndication for very early 
stage investments, supporting Hopp (2010) and Hopp and Rieder’s (2011) 
syndication thesis. 
 
Follow-on funding 
 
Two thirds (67%) of managers forecast follow-on investment requirements within the 
next year; including 83% of those funded since 2010. Requirements range from 
£100,000 for working capital to £20m of private equity to fund substantial export 
growth in a life science business, prior to an IPO. Follow-on investment requirements 
are substantial (mean £3.9m, median £3m) to ensure growth momentum through 
early marketing to establish (often global) market leading positions. Other recent 
research (North et al, 2013; Mason et al., 2013; Baldock et al., 2015) suggests timely 
follow-on funding is crucial to securing market primacy and business growth. Most 
(75%) would seek instititional VC and private equity, but around one third will seek 
further ECF funding, due to insufficient trading record or profitability to attract debt or 
private equity finance. A clear benefit of ECF involvement was that 92% of the 
managers were more confident in their ability to raise future finance.  
 
Post GFC, ECF fund managers are making far greater provision for retaining 
sufficient funds to provide follow-on funding for their better performing portfolio 
businesses. This is particularly evident amongst more recently established seed and 
early stage ECFs. Notably, Passion Capital’s accelerator model initially invests small 
amounts into a large number of businesses, follow-on funding more substantial 
amounts to better performers, conforming to Markowitz (1952) principles. However, 
ECFs have been hampered by EU state aid restrictions, particularly the 10% of fund 
size limit on individual portfolio business investments. This has resulting in one in ten 
surveyed recipient businesses being “‘considerably constrained” in raising follow-on 
funding, supporting recommendations for larger more flexible GVC funds 
(Technopolis, 2011; Rigos, 2011).          
 
Additionality or displacement? 
 
Fund managers and stakeholders unanimously agree that ECFs play an important 
role in addressing the UK’s sub-£2m seed and early stage equity gap. There is little 
evidence of funding displacement as few institutional VCs or VCTs operate at below 
£2m (Table 5) in the early stage UK market, typically specialising in expansion and 
MBO/MBI activities. Exceptions include a few emerging seed VCs in London and 
Octopus VCT, a specialist early stage investor12. London (GLA, 213) has witnessed 
recent growth of seed investment accelerators (e.g. Seedcamp13) and seed and early 
stage angel capital funds (e.g. #1 Seed, Wren Capital). However, the consensus was 
that, whilst London’s seed digitech market showed signs of overheating, demand still 
outstripped supply (GLA, 2013), with ‘smart money’ ECF fund managers’ expertise 
providing an important demonstration approach (Lerner, 2010).      
 
(insert T5) 
  
 
The surveyed ECF businesses (Table 6) exhibit high levels of project additionality, 
but lower levels of funding additionality. This replicates other UK GVC scheme 
assessments, with fund managers suggesting that their portfolio businesses typically 
overestimate their fundraising ability (BIS, 2010, 2012). Whilst just one quarter of 
surveyed managers considered that their ECF project would not have gone ahead 
without scheme funding, three fifths believe that obtaining alternative funding would 
have caused considerable delays (typically 6-12 months), or project downscaling due 
to underfunding. Delays reaching the market could severely jeopardise the ultimate 
success of the business, as indicated in other early stage business finance studies 
(BIS, 2012; North et al, 2013).        
 
The choice of VC and fund manager, or angel investor is also crucial in achieving a 
“meeting of minds” alignment of business development aims and appropriate level of 
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 Former Octopus portfolio firm ‘LoveFilm’ was acquired by Amazon in 2011 for £200m 
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 The first London accelerator, established in 2007 
input into areas such as financial management, sales and marketing including export 
market developments, networking contacts and linkages to further funding (Baldock 
et al., 2015). This supports the Gompers et al. (2010) postulation of better performing 
VCs possessing niche management and sector skills to deliver successful investment 
outcomes. Conversely, our five case studies of ECF write-off investments 
demonstrate that a breakdown in the entrepreneur – fund manager relationship is a 
key factor in failure.            
 
Fund performance: interim assessment limitations 
 
Interim assessments may occur too soon to adequately assess fund performance. 
Wiltbank (2005) recognised early exit sales are often poorer performing ‘lemons’, 
whilst ‘plum’ best performers typically take far longer to exit. Lerner (2010) also 
advocates a patient, long game, approach which fund manager feedback supported. 
Firstly, the top performing 10% of 10x plus investment multiple portfolio companies 
which determine the overall success of funds can take 10 years to mature. Secondly, 
the GFC typically set-back older portfolio investments by two years, lengthening 
average exit times to 5-7 years, a finding supported by Baldock and North’s (2015) 
UK GVC longitudinal study14 and CfEL’s15 (2013) fund managers report. This 
underlines the need for flexible fund management timescales (Lerner, 2010) and 
favours the VCT and ACF evergreen approaches over ECFs’ LP agreements.  
 
GFC impacts meant that older, pre-2010 ECF fund managers, initially aiming for at 
least 3x multiples now recognised they would do well to achieve between 2-3x. Most 
would seek two year fund extensions to manage their stronger performing portfolio 
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 32 ECF, UKIIF and Aspire funded businesses extended exit  times by average 1.5 years between 2010-2013  
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 Capital for Enterprise Limited (CfEL) formerly oversaw UK GVC schemes prior to British Business Bank 
establishment  
companies to optimal exit points, typically via trade sales. Internal rate of return (IRR) 
data fell below expectations, supporting the view that, even after 6-8 years, it was still 
too early to adequately evaluate fund performance. Benchmarking against Preqin’s16 
equivalent aged European private VC funds offered limited value since these were 
self-reported, potentially by the better performing faster maturing later stage focused 
funds. BVCA member data revealed a median negative return on investment (-1.1%) 
for 38 funds established between 2002-08. Further benchmarking against the 
Scottish Investment Bank’s (SIB) portfolio of 378 companies, including the slightly 
older established (2004) Scottish Co-investment Fund17 indicated similarly small 
numbers of exits (8 in 2013-2014, compared with 13 recorded ECF exits). These 
findings underline the need for more time for funds to mature after the GFC. Indeed, 
each ECF fund manager forecast one or two portfolio companies that could achieve 
10x multiples, but these exit returns would not be taking place for several years.   
 
Economic outputs 
 
More satisfactory economic development evidence came from the survey of current 
portfolio business performance outputs and projections, the fund managers’ caveat 
being that portfolio business managers’ projections are optimistic and rarely achieved 
(BIS, 2010, 2012). Table 6 compares the actual performance of the 75 surveyed ECF 
recipient businesses since initial funding until the time of interview in early 2014. 
Figures in parenthesis represent those businesses funded since 2010, where it is 
helpful to contrast their performance with the overall survey. The table provides key 
economic impact insights for policymakers relating to employment, income 
generation, innovation and scheme attribution. Data comes from a compliant survivor 
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 Preqin independent data on European private VC performance for funds established between 2006-10 
17
 Scottish Investment Bank (2014) data 
subset, but positive and negative response bias is likely to be controlled by the 
omission of successful exits and unsuccessful write-offs and the highly significant 
(>.05 level) representativeness of the survey sample (Table 3).  
 
(insert T6)  
 
Surveyed managers assessed their ECF funding attribution to subsequent business 
development (59%) as proportionally greater than its financial contribution to external 
project funding received (49% for the relevant funding round). This suggests that 
ECF investment generated at least a 10% net positive catalytic impact on business 
development (i.e. jobs, sales, profits, innovation) to date (this could be higher if 
follow-on funding was subsequently received from other sources). The lower 
attribution proportion (46%), but higher positive net impact (14%), amongst ECF 
recipients since 2010 reflects newer ECFs’ increase in syndication (spreading 
investment risk and increasing investor skills) producing lower proportional ECF 
funding contribution in seed and early investment rounds post GFC (Hopp, 2010); 
resulting in median ECF investment after 2010 of £255,000, with median additional 
funding of £550,000 (a 1:2 ratio of newer ECF to other external funding, compared 
with the overall scheme ratio of 1:1).  
 
Overall, in terms of both aggregate sales turnover and employment growth since 
receiving initial scheme funding, surveyed ECF recipients performed well, with 
employment almost doubling (+85%) and sales turnover approaching trebling 
(+170%). For the newer ECF recipients (post 2010), the relatively lower increase in 
sales turnover (+64%), but higher increase in employment (+138%) is indicative of 
their smaller size (average 5 employees at time of funding) and younger trading age 
(81% trading less than four years). Almost three quarters (74%) of new employment 
has been full-time in both older and newer ECFs with scheme attribution to new job 
generation particularly high (83%), representing an average of 8.5 jobs per surveyed 
business. A key spillover impact was the rapid parallel growth (+231%) in contract 
labour (e.g. IT, technical production, sales and manufacturing jobs) demonstrating, 
alongside 26% growth in new part-time employment, the flexible labour requirements 
of these businesses to facilitate growth (North et al. 2013). Notably, the vast majority 
of contract work was UK-based.  
 
Profitability proved more complex to measure as older ECF recipients were taking 
longer to gain market traction than originally planned. ECF fund managers noted that 
traditional ‘J’ curve increases in profitability were not yet occurring, with the vast 
majority of portfolio businesses still languishing in a deep valley of R&D and early 
commercialisation pre-profit activities.               
   
The vast majority of surveyed ECF businesses (93%) had increased their level of 
innovation since funding, including new and improved products, services, marketing 
and processes. Similarly, 93% experienced management improvements, with 74% 
improving work practices. ECF fund managers have introduced improved corporate 
and financial management and strengthened portfolio management teams, either 
through their board presence as NEDs, or by selective board appointments, notably 
in sales and marketing. These findings support assertions that VCs can add value to 
the performance of their portfolio companies (Baygen and Freudenberg, 2000; 
Gompers et al. 2010), with improved corporate management viewed as crucial to 
increasing the opportunities for future investments.   
 
Control Perspective   
 
A control survey of five ‘dead deals’ were randomly selected from three older ECFs, 
allowing sufficient time for performance comparison with funded counterparts. They 
come from circa 15% of applicants reaching interview and negotiation stage, with 
potentially viable propositions, which do not convert into fund investments (BIS, 
2010). Fall-out explanations varied: two withdrew, perceiving themselves too early 
stage; one preferred an alternative deal; two were rejected based on proposition and 
due diligence evidence.  
 
Whilst the small control sample is not representative of unassisted potentially viable 
applicants, it provides a suitably comparable range of sectors (3 IT/telecoms, 1 bio-
science, 1 recycling) spanning shorter and longer horizon investments, and regions 
(2 Northern region and 3 Southern region). It therefore offers useful policy-off insights 
when triangulated with other survey evidence. First, four out of five found alternative 
private equity funding, suggesting that potential duplication was avoided. Second, the 
dead deal firms generally under-performed those assisted, suggesting that the funds’ 
selection process was working efficiently. One out of five failed, compared with one 
out of ten for assisted ECFs, and another reported that delay in finding alternative 
funding resulted in 30% slower development than anticipated. This latter finding is 
indicative of the earlier assessment of surveyed assisted businesses that the timing 
of ECF funding for viable business applicants is crucial to their growth. Overall, the 
four surviving ECF dead deals achieve aggregate 43% sales turnover and 22% 
employment increases since their applications, compared to 177% sales turnover 
and 69% employment increases amongst surviving surveyed older ECF portfolio 
companies.  
 Triangulating with recipient survey findings, ECFs appear to have selected more 
viable cases, or offered more timely smarter finance, rather than duplicated any 
private investor activity.   
 
Forecast Performance  
 
Business performance forecasts are subjective. Focusing on probably more accurate 
near-term one year forecasts substantial aggregate job (+41%) and sales turnover 
(+55%) growth is anticipated. This is higher amongst newer ECF recipients, 
suggesting some will considerably step-up early commercialisation activities, with 
nine businesses predicting annual sales turnover increases between £1m-£8m, 
coming from the information technology, manufacturing and financial services 
sectors, with two-thirds located in the London-Oxbridge triangle.   
 
The three year sales turnover forecast indicates the potential value of recipient 
businesses closer to exit. At this stage, they predict annual average sales turnover of 
£11.6m (median £8.6m). This contrasts to the time of initial ECF funding, when many 
were pre trading (60%) and those with annual sales turnover averaged £1.1m 
(median £400,000).    
 
Exit Strategies  
 
Ultimately, ECFs’ success depends upon exit market conditions, which were 
reportedly very tough in the UK during the post GFC period (Baldock, 2015). The UK 
AIM, providing smaller cap business progression into public equity, has shown signs 
of revival with the notable £120m IPO in Spring 2014 of the Cambridge based life 
science company Horizon. Likewise, stellar trade sales, within the recently depressed 
UK market rather than to US or other international corporate buyers, will increase 
confidence and establish a more buoyant UK exit market. However, concerns persist 
that too many UK GVCFs sell their prized portfolio assets under value, because they 
cannot afford to follow-on fund and retain businesses until they achieve optimum exit 
size, market traction and sustainability (Baldock and Mason, 2015; Rigos, 2011).    
 
Surveyed ECF fund managers put much greater emphasis on planning their 
investment exit from the point of initial investment than previously pre GFC, 
supporting a similar trend found amongst business angels (North et al. 2013). They 
broadly accept that “…it is no longer sufficient to invest in a good business in the 
expectation that it will sell itself.”  ECF fund managers, alongside portfolio 
businesses, now invest more time contacting and networking with potential trade 
buyers and VC investors, with seed VCs particularly keen to work with potential 
follow-on investors at the full ‘series A’ stage, a point at which they may no longer 
wish to be lead investor.  
       
There have been 13 ECF exits (8%). Three recent exits were reported in our 
survey18, all being trade sales at multiples between 2-5x. Three-fifths of future exits 
are expected to be via trade sales, almost one fifth to private equity takeovers, and 
under one in ten by IPO, suggesting continuing perceptions of weakness in the AIM 
which attracted closer to 20% of VC exits in boom times (BIS, 2013). Importantly for 
the UK economy, just over half of the managers seeking trade sales expect the 
business to remain wholly in the UK and a further third expect core R&D to remain. 
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 Exits could only be surveyed if recent and contactable, older exits being excluded due to key manager 
contact tracing difficulities. 
Furthermore, amongst portfolio managers seeking trade sales, most will seek 
managerial roles in existing (50%) or new (36%) UK companies and those that 
reinvest (43%) will do so in UK businesses. Overall, this suggests that future funding 
and IP spin-out development from ECF exit companies will take place in the UK, 
suggesting considerable benefits from Lerner’s (2010) global free market GVCF 
thesis.  
 
Failures  
 
ECFs exhibit proportionally low write-down investment failures (10%), raising 
concerns that fund managers are inefficient in culling poorer performing portfolio 
businesses and focusing on their star performers. One quarter of older ECF 
recipients exhibited negative or zero sales turnover change over a median funding 
period of five years. This can result in sub-optimal fund performance (Markowitz, 
1952) diverting fund manager time and investments into “zombie” unsustainable 
companies. Contrastingly, the emerging ECF seed VC accelerator model appears 
more ruthlessly efficient, adhering to Lerner’s (2010) private sector-led GVCF vision.  
 
Importantly, the five investment failure case studies demonstrated investment 
spillover impacts, including; managers finding senior industry roles, the retention and 
redeployment of IP and patent activity, and in some cases the seeds of new business 
opportunities. 
 
 
Discussion  
 
Whilst general consensus existed amongst demand and supply side informants that 
ECFs are addressing the sub-£2m UK equity gap for young potential high growth 
SMEs, with little sign of duplication or displacement, considerable debate remains as 
to whether they have the scale, profile and reach to make significant and lasting 
impacts on the wider UK seed and early stage VC ecosystem to deliver their 
sustainable and private sector led VC aim.  
 
Supply-side informants (particularly industry trade associations and experts) 
supported holistic VC ecosystem perspectives (Hughes, 2009; Hwang and Horowitt, 
2012), suggesting the scheme can make a difference if it forms part of a cohesive 
government policy addressing both the support mechanisms developing a pipeline of 
viable young high growth potential businesses through investment readiness 
programmes, accelerators and mentors (Mason and Brown, 2013) delivered through 
the UK government’s Business Growth Service (BBB & BIS, 2015) and a suitable 
finance escalator supply of appropriate financing instruments. The latter point 
suggests an important role for the British Business Bank (Mazzucato and Penna, 
2014; Van der Schans, 2015) in monitoring and developing more effective design 
and operation of the ECFs. A key requirement is raising ECFs’ profile (highlighted by 
fund managers); they are less known than VCTs, particularly amongst financial 
intermediaries outside of specialist VC networks, underlining Lerner’s (2010) 
requirement to develop support services (accountants, lawyers, fundraisers). All 
supply-side informants agreed that it is crucial to develop a suitable exit market, 
including a functioning IPO public feeder market (Baldock, 2015), because high 
profile successful exits (lacking during the GFC period) will do most to encourage 
increasing earlier stage private VC investment.             
 
Fund managers and stakeholder trade associations noted that ECF design has seen 
increased fund size with greater attention now given to planning follow-on funding 
and exits. However, they also widely agreed that scheme funds remain too small and 
require double the £40m size previously recommended (Technopolis, 2011; Rigos, 
2011). Larger scale would enable the number and range of investments to meet 
Markowitz’s (1952) optimum of 30 investments, creating a realistic chance of 
“backing their most successful portfolio businesses through to large 100 employee 
plus high profile £100m plus trade sales or IPOs.”  ECF fund managers particularly 
noted that improved ability to develop scheme second funds would also assist the VC 
fund development cycle, enabling sizeable follow-on funding, addressing a perceived 
emerging “series A funding crisis” and supporting Cumming’s (2011) view of 
successful VC transition to balanced portfolios across stages, potentially offering 
greater attraction to large institutional (e.g. pension fund) investors that have avoided 
earlier stage investment post Dotcom (Pierrakis, 2010).        
 
ECFs are designed as feeder demonstrators, to attract high quality, innovative 
emerging fund managers with seed and early stage investment track records, 
enabling fund scaling-up and ultimately to spin-out and attraction of more private VC 
fund managers into the market, in-line with Lerner’s (2010) prescribed approach. 
Thus far, ECFs have supported early stage VC activity, contributing to the increasing 
public sector presence in the early stage UK VC market (Mason and Pierrakis, 2013), 
but as one private VC mentioned “there is very limited evidence of it spurning 
independent private VC activity”, due largely to the depressed nature of the post GFC 
UK market. However, signs of change were emerging, notably in the London market 
where Passion Capital’s ECF model has encouraged angel capital group and private 
seed VC activity, assisted by the catalysing effect of increasing seed stage 
syndication (Hopp, 2010), allied to the attraction of Enterprise Investment Scheme 
(EIS) and Seed EIS investor tax breaks (HMRC, 2014). Here it was commented by a 
trade association that ECFs are “offering a smart money lead in a rapidly developing 
market.”      
 
Finally, the future development of the enhanced £400m ECF scheme was widely 
supported, provided this harnesses the enlarged EU state aid limits. As one private 
VC noted “new Super ECFs could attract substantially more private and institutional 
investment”, better addressing follow-on funding and sustainability issues, also 
potentially offering the scale of funding to address the Rowlands gap (2009) in longer 
horizon intensive R&D investment which currently extends upwards of £5m. This was 
not addressed by other UK funds as UKIIF was fully invested and the Business 
Growth Fund was for more established businesses with annual sales turnover of at 
least £5m.       
 
 
Conclusions  
 
Despite continuing suggestions that GVCFs perform more poorly than their private 
sector counterparts, this paper finds that ECFs have evolved and adapted to meet 
the challenges of changing UK early stage entrepreneurial financing requirements 
post GFC. Focusing on assessing scheme impact demonstrates that they are 
effectively meeting the needs of viable UK seed and early stage equity gap SMEs. 
First, they have encouraged and stretch funded experienced national and 
international private-led VCs into UK seed and early stage investment, with little sign 
of duplication or displacement in addressing the sub-£2m funding gap. Second, they 
have increased in size and scale, adopting innovative strategies of inter-regional and 
international investing, increasing syndication and investor networking, increasing 
portfolios, spreading risk, and improving planning for follow-on funding and exits. 
Third, they have generated economic impact; levering investment, attributable to 
direct and indirect job generation, increased sales turnover and innovation, and 
improved business management.       
 
However, the ECFs are still a long way from meeting their objective of achieving a 
legacy of a sustainable private sector led early stage UK VC market. The 
combination of further increased size ‘Super ECFs’ and second fund developments 
enabling follow-on funding and optimal portfolio exits should enhance their profile, 
notably through successful exits, and encourage increased earlier stage investment 
from institutional, corporate and private VCs, including ECF fund manager spin-outs. 
The British Business Bank will have a crucial role in overseeing this process and 
developing a more cohesive entrepreneurial financing ecosystem. 
 
Our study has single scheme, cross-sectional limitations, undertaken during scheme 
mid-term at a time when the GFC had severely disrupted fund performance. A 
clearer view will emerge over the next three years as early pathfinder ECFs complete 
their maximum 12 year cycle. However, this paper establishes a robust framework for 
future scaled-up and longitudinal research, including potential for international GVCF 
comparator studies.  
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Table 1: The Evolution of Enterprise Capital Funds (2006-2015) 
 
Fund name Date Closed Size  Sector/Stage Location 
First £240m tranche: 8 Pathfinder ECFs – 2006-2008 
Seraphim 2006 £30m Early stage 
General Technology  
London 
Sustainable Technology 
Partnership 
2006 £30m Early stage 
Cleantech 
London 
Amadeus and Angels 
Seed Fund 
2006 £10m Seed stage to Series A 
General Technology  
Cambridge/ 
London 
IQ Capital Fund 1 2006 £25m Seed/Early stage 
General Technology 
Cambridge/ 
London 
Catapult Growth Fund 2006 £30m Early to later Growth &  
MBO Generalist 
Melton Mowbray/ 
Birmingham 
Dawn ECF 2007 £30m  Seed Stage to Series A 
Tech/Software 
London 
MMC ECF 2008 £30m  Early Stage Digital Media/ 
Software/ E-commerce 
London 
Oxford Technology  
Management 
2008 £30m Early stage 
Science/Technology 
Oxford 
Second £200m tranche: 8 ECFs – 2010- Spring 2014 
Panoramic ECF 2010 £34.1m Growth Equity  
Generalist 
Glasgow/  
London 
Passion Capital ECF 2011 £37.5m Seed Digitech London 
Notion Capital Fund 2 2012 £76.3m Early Stage to Series A 
Cloud Computing/  
Software as a Service 
London 
Longwall Ventures ECF** 2012 £40m Early stage Engineering/  
Science/ Technology 
Oxford 
Foresight Nottingham 
Fund 
2013 £40m Early/Growth stage  
Generalist 
Nottingham 
Episode 1 2013 £37.5m Early stage 
Digitech 
London 
Amadeus IV ** 
Early Stage Fund 
2014 £33.2m Seed stage to Series A 
General Technology 
Cambridge/ 
London 
Regents Park Partners II 2014 £30m Early stage software London 
Third £400m tranche: 2 ECFs – Autumn 2014  to 2017 - ongoing 
IQ Capital 2 fund* ** 2014 £42m Early stage General  
Technology/ B2B 
Cambridge/ 
London 
Passion Capital 2** 2015 £45m Seed Digitech London 
Note: Stages are adapted from BVCA (2013) VC stage descriptions: seed, start-up, early, and later venturing, growth equity 
refers to later VC and expansion and MBO/MBI; ‘Series A’ refers to the first major round of VC funding where firms are in early 
commercialisation. *IQ Capital 2 fund is the first ‘Super ECF’ complying with the enhanced EU state aid rules (£5m initial 
portfolio company investment cap and 152mE overall limit). ** Scheme second fund. 
Table 2: Summary of Data and Survey Sources 
Type of Survey/Data Description 
CATI telephone survey of assisted businesses 
(February, 2014) 
75 businesses sampled from 12 active ECFs, 
representing 45% of all assisted businesses 
Longitudinal assisted business survey 
(February, 2010 and June 2013) 
8 surviving ECF assisted businesses surveyed face 
to face and by telephone in 2010 and 2013  
Benchmark survey of assisted businesses 
(February, 2010) 
12 ECF assisted businesses surveyed in 2010; 6 
face to face and 6 by telephone 
Case studies of failed assisted businesses 
(February, 2014)  
5 (29%) case studies out of 17 failed write-off ECF 
assisted businesses 
Telephone interviews with dead deals 
(February, 2014) 
5 short telephone interviews with purposively 
selected cases that were close to receiving funding 
ECF fund manager interviews 
(February and March, 2014) 
14 semi-structured face to face ECF fund manager  
interviews, including 2 new funds yet to invest 
Other seed/early stage VC interviews 
(February and March, 2014) 
13 semi-structured face to face and telephone 
interviews with private VCs and angel groups 
Industry stakeholder/expert interviews 
(February and March, 2014) 
6 semi-structured face to face or telephone 
interviews with BVCA, UKBAA, EIF St John’s 
Innovation Centre, Angel News, leading academics 
ECF scheme data 
(Data for 2006 to end of 2013) 
ECF programme management data provided by the 
British Business Bank 
Other VC investment data 
(Parallel ECF period data) 
BVCA aggregate membership data and Preqin 
European private VC data 
 
Table 3: ECF Portfolio Company Investment Distribution Compared with BVCA Members  
 
Region* BVCA (n=815) ECF (n=166) ECF survey (n=75) 
London 35% 42% 41% 
South East 18% 16% 23% 
South West  9% 5% 3% 
East 8% 10% 9% 
West Midlands 7% 6% 1% 
East Midlands 4% 4% 5% 
Yorkshire & Humber 2% 1% 3% 
North West 4% 4% 4% 
North East 4% 1% 0% 
Scotland 5% 4% 1% 
Wales 2% 2% 0% 
Northern Ireland 3% 0% 0% 
Outside UK n/a 5% 9% 
Sector** 
Basic Materials 2% 0% 0% 
Consumer Goods 7% 4% 4% 
Consumer Services 14% 14% 18% 
Financial Services 5% 3% 8% 
Health Care 19% 9% 16% 
Industrial Activities 20% 35% 24% 
Oil & Gas 5% 0% 0% 
Technology/Telecoms  27% 35% 30% 
Utilities 1% 0% 0% 
Investment Stage**  
Seed 4% 25% 49% 
Start-up 8% 2% 16% 
Early VC 26% 38% 4% 
Later VC 10% 14% 8% 
Expansion 36% 18% 22% 
Replacement 4% 0% 0% 
MBO/MBI 11% 3% 1% 
Other late stage 2% 0% 0% 
Note: BVCA (2013) 2010-12 three year average; *BVCA data for VC stage investment (n=411); **data for all BVCA members 
investing (n=815); Mann-Whitney two tailed U tests at .05 significance exhibit no significant differences between the overall ECF 
sample and ECF surveys for region (U value 84.5, critical value 45; z-score .0256, p=.97606), sector (U value 40.5, critical value 
17; z-score .0442, p=.9681), or stage (U value 32, critical value 13; z-score .0525, p=.96012), 
Table 4: Main Purposes and Uses of ECF Finance 
 
Purpose and use for ECF finance ECF survey (n=75) 
Hire staff 81% 
R&D 76% 
Working capital 76% 
Sales and marketing 63% 
Asset equipment purchase 36% 
Premises change or development 31% 
To start-up business  25% 
Acquisition 8% 
MBO/MBI 7% 
Business recovery 4% 
Note: Interviewees could give multiple responses 
 
 
Table 5: Examples of Current UK Private Equity Fund Activity   
 
Type of Investment  
Organisation 
Number of 
funds (n=13) 
Fund Size 
Range 
Range of 
Deals 
Multiples 
Sought 
Private Venture 
Capitalists 
4 £30m-£200m £1-20m 3-5x 
Seed Venture Capital 
Funds 
3 £10m-£20m £50k-£1m 3-5x 
Venture Capital Trusts 
(VCTs) 
3 £20m-£50m £1m-£25m 3x 
Angel Capital Funds 3 <£10m £25k-£100k 5x 
Source: Baldock and Mason (2015)  
 
 
Table 6: Key ECF Interim Investee Business Performance Measures  
 
Scheme Metrics ECF (2006-2013) n=75 (funded since 2010 n=36) 
Actual Performance since funding 
Aggregate job creation  758 
% increase in aggregate jobs  85% (138% since 2010) 
Aggregate sales turnover increase £56.86m 
% increase in aggregate sales turnover 170% (64% since 2010) 
In profit 21% (7% since 2010) 
% change in profitable businesses  5% (11% since 2010) 
Innovation improvements 93% 
Average scheme % attribution to development 59% (46% since 2010) 
Average scheme finance % of project funding 49% (32% since 2010) 
Aggregate contract job creation 203 
% increase in aggregate contract jobs 231% 
Future one year prediction – change based on current performance 
Aggregate job creation 670 
% increase in aggregate jobs 41% (83% since 2010) 
Aggregate sales turnover increase £46.11m 
% change in aggregates sales turnover 55% (145% since 2010) 
Future three year prediction – change based on current performance 
Aggregate sales turnover increase £460m 
% change in aggregates sales turnover 227% (431% since 2010) 
Average sales turnover £11.6m 
Source: BIS (2015 forthcoming). Aggregate jobs include full-time and part-time employees 
Appendix I: BVCA definitions for Stages of Investment 
 
Seed: Financing that allows a business concept to be developed (e.g. production of a business plan, 
prototypes and additional research), prior to bringing a product to market and commencing large-scale 
manufacturing. 
 
Start-up: Financing for use in product development and initial marketing. Companies have not yet 
sold their product commercially. 
 
Other early stage: Financing to companies that have completed the product development stage and 
require further funds to initiate commercial manufacturing and sales. They may not yet be generating 
profits. 
 
Late stage venture: Financing to companies that have reached a fairly stable growth rate; that is, not 
growing as fast as the rates attained in the early stage. These companies may or may not be 
profitable, but are more likely to be than in previous stages of development. 
 
Expansion: Sometimes known as ‘development’ or ‘growth’ capital, provided for the growth and 
expansion of an operating company which is trading profitably. Capital may be used to finance 
increased production capacity, market or product development, and/or to provide additional working 
capital. 
 
Replacement capital: Minority stake purchase from another private equity investment 
organisation or from another shareholder or shareholders.   
 
Management buyout (MBO): Funds provided to enable current operating management and investors 
to acquire an existing product line or business, including Institutional buyouts (IBOs) and leveraged 
buyouts (LBOs) are included. 
 
Management buy-in (MBI): Funds provided to enable an external manager or group 
of managers to buy into a company. 
 
Other Late stage, including: Bridge financing: Financing made available to a company in the period of 
transition from being privately owned to being publicly quoted. PIPE: Private investment in public 
companies (minority stake only). Rescue/Turnaround: Financing made available to existing 
businesses which have experienced trading difficulties, with a view to re-establishing prosperity. Public 
to private: Purchase of quoted shares with the purpose of de-listing the company. Secondary buyout: 
Purchase of a company from another private equity investment organisation. 
 
